Kafka Had An Easier Time
After getting over the word-for-word copying of inaccurate book descriptions that are duplicated in the judge's decision and the Random House briefs, the shock has grown even more intense as we get into the rest of the decision.
It appears as if the judge is referring to some other case entirely, or has not read our legal briefs as carefully as he has Random House's.
Take this astounding quote from page 13 where Judge Daniels writes, "The gravamen of Perdue’s complaint is that Brown copied the basic premise underlying Daughter of God...."
That is simply UNtrue.
Even a first year-law student knows that a basic premise is NOT protectible. What is supported in several hundred pages of our filings (all available here for any reader to see) is that my unique expression, my original creation was copied. We presented detailed evidence, comparisons and examples of this.
This astounding situation is compounded as the judge goes on to cite a number of generalities that were section headings to our specific arguments. He cites these generalities as if they were our entire argument rather than an organization of the evidence as to the infringements of expression.
Certainly, if the generalities were the only arguments we presented, then we'd be trying to claim protection for the unprotectible. But that is not the case.
We'll look very carefully in the next post at one specific example of what we said in our filings versus what the judge SAID we SAID.
It appears as if the judge is referring to some other case entirely, or has not read our legal briefs as carefully as he has Random House's.
Take this astounding quote from page 13 where Judge Daniels writes, "The gravamen of Perdue’s complaint is that Brown copied the basic premise underlying Daughter of God...."
That is simply UNtrue.
Even a first year-law student knows that a basic premise is NOT protectible. What is supported in several hundred pages of our filings (all available here for any reader to see) is that my unique expression, my original creation was copied. We presented detailed evidence, comparisons and examples of this.
This astounding situation is compounded as the judge goes on to cite a number of generalities that were section headings to our specific arguments. He cites these generalities as if they were our entire argument rather than an organization of the evidence as to the infringements of expression.
Certainly, if the generalities were the only arguments we presented, then we'd be trying to claim protection for the unprotectible. But that is not the case.
We'll look very carefully in the next post at one specific example of what we said in our filings versus what the judge SAID we SAID.
posted by Lewis Perdue at 6:55 AM
3 Comments:
Certainly the sequencing and exact same context mean something. Changing the names is not enough, but the ultimate conclusion of the books is different. I don't think anyone will get by that. I mean they skim-think as it is. Daniels bought the whole scenes a faire line that encompases everything apprently.
Yeah, he bought the entire Random House dogma down to just editing their brief for his own ... no need to actually read the books.
Actually the judge made a BIG mistake in throwing out Olsson's analysis. The federal rules say that the expert's DATA should be admitted but that an OPINION from the expert should be excluded.
There is also precedent in complicated cases for admitting or considering expert opinion. For example, the judge is NOT qualified to rule on what constitutes a "stock element" or a "scene a' faire."
Nor is the judge qualified to understand that my expression of Gnosticism was copied and that my expression was not a simple recitation of history.
Yes, the books should have been read. I am not convinced that they were.
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